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THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT’S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW†
JAMES SALZMAN
When one thinks of international organizations and lawmaking,
the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development
(OECD) rarely merits a mention. It certainly pales in comparison to
bodies in the U.N. system: the International Labor Organization, and
the World Trade Organization (WTO). For its first fifty years, the
OECD has remained a remarkably low‐profile institution. Even
among international lawyers, few know what the organization
really does. Even those who know of the OECD tend to focus on its
well‐known activities in economic spheres, rarely thinking of its
role in relation to social or environmental issues.1 As a result, it
should come as no surprise that there has been little political
science or legal scholarship on the OECD as an institution in any
context.
This issue of The George Washington International Law Review
† This Article was given as a presentation at the Spring 2011 Symposium Toward
Coherence in International Economic Law: Perspectives at the 50th Anniversary of the OECD
hosted by The George Washington International Law Review. Substantial portions of this
Article are taken from James Salzman and Julio Bacio Terracino, Labor Rights, Globalization
and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, in SOCIAL ISSUES, GLOBALISATION, AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 311 (Virginia
A. Leary and Daniel Warner eds., 2005) and reprinted here with permission of Koninklijke
Brill NV.
 Professor of Law, Duke Law School; M.Sc. 1990, Engineering Sciences, Harvard
University; J.D. 1989, Harvard University; B.A. 1985, Yale University. Professor Salzman
worked for the Environment Directorate of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and
Development (OECD) from 1990–1992. This Article is drawn from his experiences there as
well as two previous pieces he has written on the OECD. See generally James Salzman,
Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer–Autumn 2005, at 189; James Salzman, Labor
Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 769 (2000).
1. See generally, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD Export
Credit Arrangement, 43 INT’L ORG. 173 (1989). This study of the OECD Export Credit
Arrangement provides an excellent analysis of negotiations conducted at the OECD, but the
focus is on regime formation and maintenance rather than on the OECD itself. See generally
id.
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focusing on the OECD is therefore long overdue, for the OECD has
played, and continues to play, an important and largely
unrecognized role as a lawmaking body. Professor Anne‐Marie
Slaughter, for example, has predicted that, in stark contrast to the
United Nations, “[t]he next generation of international institutions
is . . . likely to look more like the Basle Committee [, composed of
twelve central bank governors], or, more formally, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, dedicated to providing
a forum for transnational problem‐solving and the harmonization of
national law.”2
The OECD occupies a unique space in the international
lawmaking field, in large part because it was not established with
lawmaking as a priority. First established to administer the
Marshall Fund for the reconstruction of Europe, the OECD’s
founding treaty mandated the organization to promote policies
designed:
(a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and
employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries,
while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to
the development of the world economy;
(b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as
well as non‐Member countries in the process of economic
development; and
(c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a
multilateral, non‐discriminatory basis in accordance with
international obligations.3

Its primary purpose was economic rather than legislative. To
that end, the OECD plays a range of roles.
First and foremost, the OECD is a research and networking
organization. By virtue of its restricted membership, the OECD in
many respects acts as an exclusive club whose members produce
two‐thirds of the world’s goods and services. The OECD provides a
private setting for wealthy industrialized governments to share
experiences, identify issues of common concern, and coordinate
domestic and international policies. In simple terms, the OECD’s
range of standing inter‐governmental committees serve as useful
talking shops for countries to share experiences, learning from one
another’s successes and challenges. While not voiced openly, the
2. James Salzman & Julio Bacio Terracino, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions:
The Role and Influence of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, in
SOCIAL ISSUES, GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 312, 313 (Virginia A. Leary &
Daniel Warner eds., 2006) (citations omitted).
3. Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
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closed‐door meetings of the OECD provide an important alternative
forum to what is often viewed as the developing country‐dominated
and politicized U.N. system. The OECD occupies a unique position
in the constellation of international organizations, with
membership broader than the European Union, the Nordic Council,
or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), yet much
more restrictive than the United Nations or WTO, and with topic
coverage as broad as any international organization. As a result, the
OECD provides a restricted forum on virtually unrestricted topics.
The OECD also acts as a high‐powered research institution. Its
more than 2000 employees (many of whom are economists) collect
data, monitor trends, forecast economic developments, and develop
policy options for consideration by member countries.
Its
Economic Outlook series, for example, forecasts macroeconomic
trends over the next two years such as gross domestic product,
employment, account balances, and interest rates, each of which is
followed closely by the global financial media. The OECD’s ability to
gather and synthesize data on members’ policy initiatives and
results provides a wealth of insight concerning which types of
policies work best in particular settings. Unlike sector‐specific
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP), the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Program, the International Monetary Organization and
others, the OECD’s research occurs in virtually all fields of interest
to governmentsincluding trade, environment, agriculture,
technology, taxation, education, foreign assistance, and
employment. The result is over 250 books published annually, in
addition to many reports that are not published.4
Importantly, the OECD’s research is purposely conducted on
behalf of member country government officials, who direct from the
outset the scope of work with their own domestic policy and legal
development concerns in mind. The research agendas can be
strategic, with domestic agency officials attempting to use the OECD
Such
as a fulcrum to leverage policies in their capitals.
transgovernmental coalition building “takes place when sub‐units
build coalitions with like‐minded agencies from other governments
against elements of their own administrative structures.”5 Because
its organization is so decentralized, with each specialty directorate’s
work plan set by the respective national ministers (environment
4. Id. at 317–18 (citations and footnotes omitted).
5. Id. at 319 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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ministers establishing the agenda of the Environment Directorate,
trade ministers determining the projects of the Trade Directorate,
etc.), the OECD offers enormous flexibility and speed compared to
other international institutions.
In addition to its primary role of convening and research, the
OECD has in a number of instances directed the negotiation and
adoption of international legal instruments. Article 5 of the OECD’s
Convention provides for member countries, through the Council of
Ministers, to take three types of legal actionrecommendations,
decisions, and agreements with other governmental bodies.
Recommendations are nonbinding agreements that generally
represent policy advice with a strong base of support.6 For
example, in response to the increasing use of information
technology to create new avenues for offshore investment for the
purposes of tax avoidance and evasion, the OECD Council adopted
two recommendations to improve exchange of information between
countries advocating the use of tax identification numbers and a
standard magnetic format for automatic exchange of information.7
Member countries generally use recommendations either as a
means to influence domestic policy development, arguing in their
respective capitals that the OECD has endorsed a particular
approach, or as a precursor to a decision.
Decisions are legally binding on member countries.
Not
surprisingly, adoption of decisions is less frequent than adoption of
recommendations and the negotiations are followed much more
closely by member countries.8 In 1972, for example, the OECD
adopted a decision confirming the importance of the Polluter‐Pays
Principle.9 The Polluter‐Pays principle is “a fundamental principle
for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control measures
introduced by the public authorities in Member countries,” that
states that the polluter should bear the expenses of its impacts.10
6. Id. at 319 (citations and footnotes omitted).
7. See generally Org. for Econ. Co‐operation & Dev. [OECD], Recommendation of the
Council of the OECD on the Use of the Revised OECD Standard Magnetic Format for Automatic
Exchange of Information, OECD Doc. C(97)30/FINAL (July 10, 1997); OECD,
Recommendation of the Council on the Use of Tax Identification Numbers in an International
Context, OECD Doc. C(97)29/FINAL (May 23, 1997).
8. Salzman & Terracino, supra note 2, at 321 (footnotes omitted).
9. See generally OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles
Concerning International Economic Aspect of Environmental Policies, OECD Doc. C(72)128,
Annex, ¶¶ 1–5 (May 26, 1972) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
10. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Implementation of the Polluter‐Pays
Principle, OECD Doc. C(74)(223), art. I (Nov. 14, 1974); see also Guiding Principles, supra
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Now accepted in environmental economics as the straightforward
requirement to internalize negative externalities,11 the Polluter‐
Pays Principle was tremendously important in shaping early
environmental pollution laws.
Article 6 of the OECD Convention requires consensus for
adoption of recommendations and decisions, though members may
abstain and thereby enter the equivalent of a reservation. The
practice of closing meetings to the public and the consensus
requirement for recommendations and decisions eliminates much
of the acrimony and political grandstanding in other fora such as
the U.N. General Assembly. If proponents of a recommendation or
decision face concerted opposition from even a few countries, a
vote will not be taken until significant negotiation has produced a
text acceptable to all the member countries. Despite the fact that
decisions are binding, it is exceedingly rare for any OECD decision
to provide sanctions for noncompliance.
While limited in number, the OECD’s drafting of international
agreements has played a significant role in crafting the emerging
architecture of global governance. The agreements negotiated at
the OECD, for example, reduce the importance of tax havens,
prohibit bribery in international business transactions, regulate the
transfrontier movement of hazardous wastes, revise codes of
conduct for corporate governance, and create multilateral rules for
foreign direct investment. In all of these cases, the agreements set
in place multilateral rules where weak or nonexistent international
limits operated before.12
The next Part provides a series of case studies, providing detailed
examples of how the OECD has developed international law.
I. HAZARDOUS WASTE TRADE
In the 1980s, a high‐profile series of illegal waste dumping riveted
the public’s attention. The nature of these toxic shipments was
fraudulently concealed from developing countries. The infamous
Koko case in 1988 came to represent one of the worst examples of
transboundary movements of hazardous waste.13 In return for
note 9, ¶¶ 1–5.
11. See generally, e.g., OECD, The Polluter‐Pays Principle as It Relates to International
Trade, OECD Doc. COM/ENV/TD(2001)44/FINAL (Dec. 23, 2002).
12. Salzman & Terracino, supra note 2, at 322–23 (footnotes omitted).
13. For a case study of the Koko incident, see Alessandra M. Poropot et al., Nigeria
CASE
STUDIES
(Jan.
1993),
Waste
Imports
from
Italy,
TED
http://www1.american.edu/ted/nigeria.htm.
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paying $100 monthly rent to a Nigerian national for use of his
farmland, five ships transported 18,000 barrels of Italian hazardous
waste to the small river town of Koko, Nigeria.14 Some waste
leached into the river, causing chemical burns and a number of
deaths.15 Italy was eventually forced, under the spotlight of
international media attention and pressure from Nigeria (after the
Nigerian seizure of an unrelated Italian ship), to repackage the
waste and send it back to Italy for appropriate disposal.16 On its
return trip to Italy, the ship bearing the waste was refused port in
Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United States.17 As a
result of this and similar scandals, Nigeria and Cameroon banned
the importation of hazardous waste and instituted the death
penalty for anyone found to be violating the ban.18
This toxic waste trade was denounced by some as “Eco‐
Imperialism” and there were increasing calls by developing
countries to halt the waste trade entirely,19 a commercial activity
worth millions of dollars. Action needed to be taken at both the
domestic and international level. The difficulties faced by the
United States in preventing shipments to countries with little
capacity to manage and dispose of waste, and the problems posed
by the differences in the definition of “hazardous waste” in
European countries led to an increasing recognition of the need for
an international framework to establish universal standards for the
management and disposal of waste shipped across borders. Yet
there was no meaningful international law in place. Spurred by
national and regional initiatives, in the early 1980s both UNEP and
the OECD turned their focus to the management of hazardous
wastes.
The OECD promulgated the first international instrument
14. Id. pt. A(1)‐(2).
15. See id. pt. A(2) (discussing chemical burns and premature births caused by the
waste); Anthony Akaeze, Koko: 23 Years after the Toxic Waste Dump, NEWSWATCH (Aug. 16,
2010),
http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2343&Ite
mid=42 (discussing deaths caused by the waste).
16. See Poropot et al, supra note 13, pts. A(2), B(5).
17. Seaport Envtl. Sec. Network, Int’l Network for Envtl. Compliance & Enforcement,
The International Hazardous Waste Trade Through Seaports 2 (Nov. 24, 2009),
http://www.inece.org/seaport/SeaportWorkingPaper_24November.pdf
(unnumbered
working paper).
18. Charles P. Wallace, Asia Tires of Being the World’s Toxic Waste Dumping Ground, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1994, at A3.
19. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 149 (2004).
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regarding the international movement of hazardous waste in 1984
with its Decision‐Recommendation of the Council on Transfrontier
Movements of Hazardous Waste, mandating OECD member states
to ensure that competent authorities of countries affected by the
shipments of hazardous waste are provided “adequate and timely”
information on its movement.20 The OECD also adopted a series of
far‐reaching, though nonbinding, recommendations.
These
included the principle that prior consent from the importing and
transit states should be obtained for intra‐OECD shipments of
waste; the requirement that the exporter should provide detailed
information to the importing country regarding the origin, nature,
composition, and quantity of the waste to be shipped as well as
environmental risks involved in transport; and the obligation of the
generator to dispose of the waste if an importer cannot safely
dispose of it.21
In 1986, these same guidelines were extended to transboundary
shipments of waste involving OECD members and nonmember
states.22 The 1986 OECD Decision‐Recommendation of the Council
on Exports of Hazardous Wastes from the OECD Area, among other
things, prohibited both the export of hazardous waste to non‐OECD
countries without prior consent from the receiving country or
notice to transit nations, and the export of hazardous waste to non‐
OECD states that lack the proper disposal facilities.23 Despite these
impressive initiatives, numerous problems accompanied the
implementation of this regulatory regime.
Spurred by high‐profile international incidents involving the
shipment of hazardous wastes to developing countries, in 1987
UNEP’s Governing Council adopted the Cairo Guidelines. The Cairo
Guidelines were a nonbinding agreement on environmentally sound
management of hazardous waste.24 UNEP’s Governing Council also
20. OECD, Decision‐Recommendation of the Council on the Reduction of Transfrontier
Movements of Hazardous Waste, art. I, OECD Doc. C(83)180/FINAL (Feb. 1, 1984), reprinted
in 23 I.L.M. 214 (1984) [hereinafter Decision on Transfrontier Waste Movement].
21. See Principles Concerning Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Waste, ¶¶ 2, 3, 5,
appended to Decision on Transfrontier Waste Movement, supra note 20.
22. See generally OECD, Decision–Recommendation of the Council on Exports of
Hazardous Wastes from the OECD Area, OECD Doc. C(86)64/FINAL (June 5, 1986)
[hereinafter Decision on Waste Exports], reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1010 (1986).
23. See Measures Concerning the Control of Exports of Hazardous Wastes, ¶¶ 1,
4(c)(ii), appended to Decision on Waste Exports, supra note 22; see also OECD, Decision of the
Council on Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Wastes, OECD Doc. C(88)90/FINAL, Annex
(May 27, 1988), as reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 257 (1989) (revising the definition of hazardous
waste).
24. See United Nations Env’t Program, Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the
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agreed to commence international negotiations on a binding legal
instrument governing the transboundary movements of hazardous
waste.25 This draft was eventually negotiated into the Basel
Convention, which was concluded on March 22, 1989.26
The role of the OECD’s earlier decision and recommendations in
influencing UNEP action is noteworthy. These agreements served
as a template for the Basel Convention negotiations.27 It is no
exaggeration to say that lawmaking at the OECD provided both the
impetus and the foundation for more far‐reaching agreements in
the United Nations. Indeed, article 11 of the Basel Convention
provides an explicit exemption for trade with nonparties who are
members of comparable agreements.28 This has allowed the United
States to remain a nonparty and trade with other OECD member
states through the OECD decision framework.
II. THE BRIBERY CONVENTION
The OECD’s work on bribery provides a similar example of using
recommendations and decisions to spur agreements in other
international fora. In 1975, the U.N. General Assembly adopted by
consensus a resolution on “Measures against corrupt practices of
transnational and other corporations, their intermediaries, and
others involved.” This led four years later to a draft convention on
illicit payments. The draft convention was never adopted, however,
because developing countries demanded adoption of stronger
corporate codes as a precondition for their support. As India stated
on behalf of the G77, “the UN Conference on an International
Agreement on Illicit Payments [can] be convened only after
completion of the UN Conference on a Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporation.” Developed countries, opposed the
Code of Conduct and, as a result, neither the code nor the draft
convention on illicit payments was adopted.
Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.122/3 (Dec.
10, 1985), reprinted in 8 UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW GUIDELINES AND
PRINCIPLES (1987); see also United Nations Env’t Program, Governing Council,
Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, 14th Sess., U.N. Doc.
UDEP/GC.14/30 (June 17, 1987) (adopting the Cairo Guidelines).
25. Carol Annette Petsonk, The Role of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) in the Development of International Environmental Law, 5 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
351, 373–74 (1990).
26. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Basel Convention].
27. See Petsonk, supra note 25, at 374.
28. Basel Convention, supra note 26, art. 11.
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It took almost twenty years later for the OECD, without
developing country opposition, to address the issue directly.
Following extensive discussions amongst member countries, the
OECD adopted recommendations in 1994, 1996, and 1997 on
various aspects of bribery, calling on member countries to combat
international corruption by making bribery of foreign public
officials a crime, preventing tax deductions for bribes, prohibiting
corruption in contracts funded by development assistance
programs, and creating effective company rules on accounting and
auditing to reveal practices of bribery. In December, 1997, the
member countries and five nonmembers agreed to a decision that
made binding the steps agreed to in previous recommendations.
The Convention on Combating Bribery provided for monitoring by
the Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions to ensure full implementation. Soon after, the United
Nations adopted a declaration against bribery referring to the OECD
and Organization of American States Conventions and passed a code
of conduct for public officials.29
III. OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
Following revelations in the early 1970s of wide‐scale unethical
and illegal activities by multinational companies, the United
Nations, International Labor Organization, OECD, and national
governments focused on means to influence their behavior. Much
of the early activity centered on the United Nation’s attempt to draft
a Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. The U.N. General
Assembly adopted a consensus resolution on measures against
corrupt transnational practices, but failed to follow up with a
stronger legal instrument. One year later, in 1976 the OECD Council
of Ministers adopted a recommendation entitled the Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.
As its name suggests, the overriding purpose of the Declaration is
to promote transnational investment.30 To this end, the Declaration
called for member countries to respect national treatment
(according comparable treatment to foreign‐controlled enterprises
as accorded to domestic enterprises), minimize conflicting
requirements on multinational enterprises (MNEs) by different
governments, and make transparent incentives and disincentives to

29. Salzman & Terracino, supra note 2, at 321–22 (citations and footnotes omitted).
30. Id. at 331–32 (footnotes omitted).
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investment.31 In its introduction and seven chapters, the original
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) covered a
wide breadth of issues governing investments.32 The separate
chapters range from such topics as information disclosure,
competition, and financing to taxation, science, and technology but
the requirements are generally vague and hortatory.
One of its chapters set forth voluntary rules of conduct for MNEs.
These Guidelines were necessary to promote investment, it was
argued, in order to prevent misunderstandings and build an
atmosphere of confidence and predictability between business,
labor and governments. The Guidelines, it was hoped, would
ensure that the operation of MNEs was compatible with the
expectations of the host country by establishing a baseline of labor
rights.33
Implementation of the Guidelines commences at the national
contact points within national governments.34 National contact
points serve as the initial stage of consideration for issues and
conflicts arising under the Guidelines. Any party who believes the
Guidelines have been violated may request consultations with the
Contact Points. If the discussions at this level do not resolve the
issue between the parties, it can be passed to the OECD’s Committee
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME).
CIME, located within the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and
Enterprise Affairs (DAFFE), is ultimately responsible for
adjudication and development of the Guidelines. In response to
disputes passed up by the National Contact Points, CIME responds
by clarifying or interpreting specific language. All CIME decisions
require consensus among the member countries.
Dispute resolution under the Guidelines should not be thought of
31. See generally ORG. ECON. CO‐OPERATION & DEV., Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, in DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF OECD
MEMBER COUNTRIES AND DECISIONS OF THE OECD COUNCIL ON GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES, NATIONAL TREATMENT, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES,
CONSULTATION PROCEDURES 7 (1976). The Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises was updated in 2000. OECD, The OECD Declaration and Decisions
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Basic Texts, OECD Doc.
DAFFE/IME(2000)20 (Nov. 9, 2000).
32. See generally ORG. ECON. CO‐OPERATION & DEV., Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, in DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES AND DECISIONS
OF THE OECD COUNCIL ON GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, NATIONAL TREATMENT,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES, CONSULTATION PROCEDURES 7
(1976).
33. Salzman & Terracino, supra note 2, at 332.
34. Id. at 335.
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as a traditional judicial model, for CIME’s decisions have no
retrospective applicability. Indeed since the Guidelines were
adopted as recommendations, they cannot be treated as binding
standards. CIME’s judgments do not enforce the Guidelines against
either of the parties. Perhaps surprisingly, given the formality of
the process, CIME makes a judgment on the behavior of the
companies in question. Instead it uses the case to clarify the
meaning of how a provision in the Guidelines should be applied in
future cases. In a legislative context, the closest analogy to this
practice would be if the U.S. Congress continued creating legislative
history after its passage of a statute. The logic behind this system is
similar to that of the common law’s clarification of doctrine in
specific applications. Unlike the common law analogue, however,
CIME interpretations are never binding once established.35
Despite critics, the Guidelines’ are widely viewed as meaningful.
Richard Rowan, a professor at the Wharton Business School,
contends that the Guidelines provide useful mechanisms to
influence OECD member countries and their corporations through
surveillance and peer pressure. The Guidelines, he claims,
have been used by the international union movement to support
broader union goals. Publicity pertaining to the cases has led to
union pressure for the establishment of binding guidelines and
legislation. This has been evident . . . in the pressure placed by
the European Trade Union Confederation on the European
Commission for the passage of the Vredeling proposal.36

In a later book, Rowan argued that the Guidelines could serve the
role of “enforced international regulation of multinationals”
through adverse publicity.37 And, in fact, there are several examples
of this.38
35. Id. at 336.
36. See Richard L. Rowan, Co‐director, Indus. Research Unit, Wharton Sch., Univ. of
Penn., Remarks at the Kenneth M. Piper Lecture at the Chicago‐Kent College of Law:
Transnational Regulation of the Labor Relations of Multinational Enterprises (Mar. 31,
1982), in 58 CHI‐KENT L. REV. 909, 928 (1982). The Vredeling proposal requires employers
to provide information to and consult with local employees at least forty days prior to
decisions that are liable to have a substantial effect on the interests of employees, including
the rationale for the decision as well as the legal, economic, and social consequences to
employees. See ROGER BLANPAIN, EUROPEAN LABOUR LAW 764 (12 ed. 2010).
37. DUNCAN C. CAMPBELL & RICHARD L. ROWAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE OECD
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES 7 (1983).
38. See id. at 7–8 (discussing challenges brought under the Guidelines). Lance Compa
argues that:
In the 1980s, a U.S. union facing anti‐labor conduct by the local management
of a U.S. subsidiary of the Swedish Electrolux corporation used the OECD
contact points system. Swedish unions pressured their government to
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IV. THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
These three previous case studies have all suggested a clear
pattern. A topic of major concern arises on the international stage,
such as hazardous waste trade, bribery, or corporate conduct.
Efforts within the United Nations or other international
organizations to draft an agreement are unsuccessful. The OECD
proceeds on its own and provides an agreement that serves as the
basis for future negotiations in fora with wider membership. The
keys to this approach are opportunism and path dependence. The
OECD serves as an advantageous forum to host negotiations, in part
because of its significant technical expertise, in part because of its
membership of like‐minded countries, and in part because of its
closed proceedings. As we have seen, this can be a very effective
strategy to provide the tracks on which the train of international
agreements proceeds. But it does not always work. This is most
evident in the story of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI).
In the early 1990s, the OECD’s CIME commenced a research
project known as the Wider Investment Instrument Project. The
project reflected the concern among member countries that existing
multilateral instruments governing foreign direct investment (FDI)
had become inadequate in the face of unprecedented increases in
investment. Flows of foreign capital to developing countries, for
example, had increased ten‐fold from 1982 to 1993 and almost
twenty‐fold by 1996, with a 40% increase in FDI inflows from 1994
to 1995 alone. Total FDI exceeded the value of goods in trade by
more than five‐fold yet, remarkably, no comprehensive agreement
existed at the international legal governing FDI.
Absent a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or
other treaty, the international legal framework governing FDI has
developed in a piecemeal, incremental approach through a broad
network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). BITs both establish
and clarify the rights of foreign investors. Mirroring the growth of
FDI, the number of BITs has dramatically increased, as well. From
1989 to 1995, more BITs were negotiated than during the previous
persuade Swedish parent company managers to convince U.S. executives to
halt their objectionable conduct. In 1990, the United Food and Commercial
Workers made a similar move to the OECD in a dispute with the Belgium‐
based Carrefour supermarket chain. International pressure that included
solidarity moves by Belgian unions brought about a settlement in April 1991,
by which the company recognized the union and entered into bargaining.
Lance Compa, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and International Labor Rights: A
Failed Connection, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 683, 690 (1998).

OECD GW ARTICLE FINALSALZMAN_ARTICLE_EME.DOC

2011]

3/1/2012 12:46 PM11:06 AM

The OECD’s Role in International Law

113

three decades. By 1995, over 900 BITs had been signed between
more than 150 nations. Through its Wider Investment Instrument
Project, the OECD member countries sought to bring order to this
proliferation of FDI and BITs, perhaps through an agreement that
consolidated and harmonized the many BITsthrough a
multilateral agreement on investment.39
During the Uruguay Round, a number of countries had sought to
harmonize the patchwork of BITs through an MAI. The United
States and others proposed a comprehensive investment agreement
but faced concerted opposition from developing countries. The
ultimate compromise, the Agreement on Trade‐Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs Agreement), addressed investment restrictions
that directly affect trade flows in goods. While it represented the
first global agreement specifically directed at FDI since 1947, the
TRIMs Agreement’s narrow focus on investment measures that
distort trade left the most important investment measures outside
the agreement and, therefore, outside the scope of the WTO dispute
settlement process. Described by one commentator as “a useful if
somewhat meagre result of five years of tough negotiation,” the
TRIMs Agreement was not viewed at the time as a significant
achievement, largely re‐stating GATT law. Several other Uruguay
Round agreements, most notably the General Agreement on Trade
in Services and the Agreement on Trade‐Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, created disciplines liberalizing FDI but
these only represented first steps, failing to address the bulk of
FDI.40
Against this backdrop of failure, following the completion of over
seventy preparatory studies, in 1995 CIME and the Committee on
Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT) reported to
the OECD Council that “the foundations have now been laid for the
successful negotiation of . . . [an MAI] building on OECD’s existing
instruments and expertise.” Based on this advice, the OECD Council
decided to move from research of BITs to negotiation of the MAI.
The stated goal was to complete the treaty by May 1997. A high‐
level negotiating group was established outside the directorate
structure, serviced by DAFFE (primarily from CIME) secretariat
staff. They were given a mandate to create an agreement that
would:
provide a broad multinational framework for international
39. Salzman & Terracino, supra note 2, at 355 (citations and footnotes omitted).
40. Id. at 361–62 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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investment with high standard for the liberalisation of
investment regimes and investment protection and with
effective dispute settlement procedures; be a free‐standing
international treaty open to all OECD Members and the European
Communities, and to accession by non‐OECD Member countries.

Drafting groups and preparatory groups were established to
address specific issues and flesh out areas of agreement before
going to the main negotiating group in plenary session. All the
member countries participated and within two years, eight
nonmember countries had joined as observers.
From the outset, the MAI negotiations were regarded internally
by the secretariat as a relatively straightforward technical
harmonization exercise. Given that there was a great deal in
common among the many investment treaties, it was expected that
the OECD secretariat would review the range of BIT texts, identify
common features, and create a unifying draft that would form the
basis of a general agreement. The MAI, it was hoped, would be the
first comprehensive international investment treaty creating
uniform rules for FDI protection, liberalization, and dispute
settlement. By creating a more level playing field than the bumpy
terrain of BITs, the MAI would greatly reduce distortions to
investment flows and therefore speed the growth of FDI,
significantly promoting the liberalization of investment measures
and performance requirements beyond the results of the Uruguay
Round agreements. If adopted, the MAI would supersede the OECD
Codes and the Declaration, providing in their place an agreement
with substance and teeth.
It is important to remember that the OECD was chosen as the
negotiating forum for the MAI by the member countries, not by the
OECD staff itself. When controversy erupted over the negotiations
in 1997, selection of the OECD as a negotiating forum was criticized
as a dubious choice, at best. In many respects, though, this was an
eminently reasonable decision, for the OECD seemingly offered
three comparative institutional advantages over rival negotiating
fora.
First, the goal of the negotiations was consistent with the OECD’s
founding goal of liberalizing trade and capital flows. The OECD had
much greater in‐house expertise (in particular the DAFFE
secretariat in CIME and CMIT) on international investment issues
than the other relevant IGOs, particularly the trade‐focused WTO
and the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). This was the same organization, after all, that had
drafted the Investment Codes in the first place. The secretariat
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considered the undertaking strictly an analytical project that made
use of the OECD’s substantial institutional knowledge.41
Second, the OECD had a successful record in hosting international
negotiations. OECD recommendations and decisions are adopted
every year, often involving intensive negotiation among member
countries. During the same period as the Wider Investment
Instrument Project, for example, the OECD successfully served as
the negotiating forum for the bribery convention.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the OECD’s restricted
membership increased the likelihood of success. Aside from the
newest members, all the OECD governments had worked closely
together in the past for the purpose of liberalizing investment flows
and could be expected to favor an MAI. After all, by the time of the
MAI all the OECD member countries had removed exchange
controls and further rolled back restrictions on inward FDI both
through unilateral steps and as part of regional trade agreements
within the European Union and NAFTA. OECD members accounted
for 85% of all FDI outflows.
It also seems likely that the concerted opposition by developing
countries in the WTO provided a strong incentive to negotiate the
MAI at the OECD. If it were not possible to gain broad developing
country support for global investment rules, then negotiations at
fora with inclusive membership such as the WTO or UNCTAD would
prove fruitless. The like‐mindedness of OECD member countries is
the raison d’être for the organization’s existence. Why not, then,
commence MAI negotiations in a forum where success seemed
more assured? The OECD Council’s decision to commence
negotiations of the MAI came shortly after the Final Act of the
Uruguay Round. The shift of investment negotiations from the WTO
to the OECD certainly suggests a causal influence.42
The OECD member countries appear to have relied on a “build it
and they will come” strategy of treaty development. From the
outset, it was expected that the MAI would be a free‐standing treaty
open to accession by nonmember countries on a negotiated basis.
In many respects this was no different than the history of the GATT.
The original contracting parties in 1947 surely expected that other
countries would accede to the treaty and adopt the GATT’s
disciplines as the benefits of liberalized trade become clear. Nor did
the Treaty of Rome and subsequent European Community and
41. Id. at 362–64 (citations and footnotes omitted).
42. Id. at 364–65 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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European Union treaties dissuade hopeful applicants for
membership despite the requirement that the established laws
must be accepted as a condition to accession. It was the explicit
strategy of some of the member countries (and certainly of the
European Union) to use the result of OECD negotiations as the basis
for an even broader WTO agreement on direct investment. The
communiqué from the 1996 OECD ministerial meeting declared the
member countries’ “interest in beginning an examination of trade
and investment in the WTO and working towards a consensus,
perhaps including the possibility of negotiations.” 43
Moreover, despite the later assertions of MAI critics, MAI
negotiations were never concealed as a covert fact or held in secret.
To the contrary, the activities were announced in OECD press
releases, articles were published in the organization’s magazine, the
OECD Observer, and many of the conference papers were posted on
the OECD Internet website created for the MAI in June, 1996.
Indeed the OECD held an early press conference to discuss issues
concerning negotiation of the MAI and no one showed up.44 In a
matter of months, though, this radically changed.
Indeed, the rapidity and effectiveness of nongovernmental
organization (NGO) opposition to the MAI was unprecedented.
From the end of 1995, a small number of NGOs started to follow the
negotiations and oppose both the goals and content of the MAI
process. The OECD held an informal meeting with interested NGOs
in December of 1996. While the OECD was open in terms of
announcing the process of the negotiations and their general status,
in keeping with OECD procedures the internal documents were
restricted. In February, 1997, however, the group Public Citizen,
founded by Ralph Nader, got hold of the current chairman’s draft
(i.e. the consolidated negotiating text up to that point) and posted it
on the Internet. This posting provided the catalyst for widespread
and hard line opposition of NGOs against the MAI. Just two months
later, a more formal meeting for NGOs was hosted by members of
the negotiating group and secretariat officials. While the OECD’s
first consultative meeting with interested groups about the MAI had
been in an empty room, the October briefing attracted over seventy
representatives from thirty groups around the world. In a mere
matter of months, through the Internet and e‐mail a global
campaign against the MAI had come into being. Drafts and bulletins
43. Id. at 366–67 (citations and footnotes omitted).
44. Id. at 368.
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on the MAI were now regularly posted on a host of NGO websites.
By 1998, anti‐MAI campaigns were active in more than half of the
OECD countries as well as many developing countries. 45
The impact of a global NGO campaign against the MAI was quickly
felt. By the time the chairman’s draft was issued in early 1998, with
the exception of mandated national contact points, many of the
NGOs’ demands had been met. Despite earlier protestations by
some member countries, text was inserted to prohibit the lowering
of social and environmental standards to attract FDI, to ensure that
treaty obligations would not prevent governments from
maintaining (or heightening) protective social and environmental
standards, and to ban claims by foreign investors for compensation
for losses caused by nondiscriminatory regulatory actions.
These concessions, however, came too late, for the NGO campaign
had taken on a life of its own in domestic politics.46 In this setting
the OECD’s lack of experience in managing highly contentious
negotiations proved fatal. As the OECD’s secretary‐general later
acknowledged, the OECD was badly outgunned in the world of
public relations.
The OECD’s reactions to growing NGO
attacksmore press conferences and enhancing the MAI home‐
page on its websitehad the same effect as whistling into a
storm.47
In early 1998, seeking to resurrect the chances of renewed fast
track authority from Congress, the Clinton Administration curried
favor with local constituencies by denouncing the MAI as “fatally
flawed” and demanding that it be reconsidered.
Domestic
opposition also flared up in Paris, where demonstrations in
February took aim at the impact of the MAI on France’s ability to
protect its cultural heritage. In response, the MAI negotiations were
formally suspended for six months for a period of assessment by
the negotiating parties.
On October 14, one week before
negotiations were scheduled to resume, Prime Minister Jospin of
France released an official statement in the Chamber of Deputies,
declaring that since the MAI posed “fundamental problems with
respect to the sovereignty of states” and was in its current state
“unreformable,” that France would pull out of the negotiations. One
of the MAI’s strongest early proponents, France held out the
possibility of resuming negotiations but only on “an entirely new
45. Id. at 376.
46. Id. at 378–80 (citations and footnotes omitted).
47. Id. at 377–78.
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basis.” Its abandonment of negotiations meant the European Union
had to follow, effectively dooming the OECD’s negotiation of an
MAI.48
With the MAI, the OECD’s model of negotiating a foundational
agreement among its members and then using that as the basis for
further negotiations in other fora failed. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to go into the substantive reasons for the MAI’s demise
but one point stands out. Both the OECD secretariat and the
member country governments clearly underestimated the political
sensitivity and implications of an MAI. They thought negotiation of
the MAI was a technical exercise, requiring expertise the OECD was
uniquely well suited to provide. As a result, the country delegates
failed to ask for high‐level political support at the outset.
Realization that the seemingly technical matters had significant
political implications came too late in the game. In retrospect, too,
it’s clear that the OECD had neither the capacity nor experience to
respond to a concerted NGO campaign. The OECD as an institution
was not used to being in the public spotlight.49
V. CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTING
There are two key lessons one can draw from these case studies
about the OECD’s role in international law‐making. The first is the
importance of what might be termed conditional agenda setting. As
mentioned above, Anne‐Marie Slaughter held out the OECD as a
model for future international organizations. The basis for her
prediction
lies
in
the
growth
of
transgovernmentalismcooperative problem‐solving by global
networks of subparts of the state such as courts, agencies,
legislatures, and executives. “These parts,” Slaughter argues, “are
networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of
relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order. . . .
[T]ransgovernmentalism is rapidly becoming the most widespread
and effective mode of international governance”
As recognized by Slaughter, though often overlooked, the OECD
exercises enormous influence simply through its organizational
activities.50 Consider that the OECD’s committees, working groups,
expert groups, and conferences bring together approximately
40,000 government officials and experts annually. Inevitably, some
48. Id. at 380 (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 382.
50. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
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of these gatherings coalesce into a core of identifiable groups of
experts that exercise influence over the delineation of policy
challenges and strategic analysis of their resolution.51 Beyond
guiding and informing the secretariat’s activities, these repeated
encounters can subtly (and sometimes not so subtly) guide the
officials’ attitudes and activities, as well. As a classic international
relations article observed over twenty‐five years ago:
When the same officials meet recurrently, they sometimes
develop a sense of collegiality which may be reinforced by their
membership in a common profession, such as economics,
physics, or meteorology. Individual officials may even define
their roles partly in relation to their transnational reference
group rather than in purely national terms . . . Regularized
patterns of policy coordination can therefore create attitudes
and relationships that will at least marginally change policy or
affect its implementation. 52

Put simply, by providing a forum for government officials and
nongovernmental experts to meet and share research and
experiences on cutting edge policy issues, institutions can frame the
issues for future collective consideration, lay the groundwork for
agreement and identify whose the influential voices in the policy
debate shall be. 53
Richard Stewart has described one such activity of coordination
as “horizontal arrangements” of administrative law that “involve
informal cooperation among national regulatory officials to
coordinate policies and enforcement practices in areas such as
antitrust, telecommunications, chemicals regulation, and
transportation safety.”54 This coordination, he writes, “helps to
reduce barriers to trade and commerce created by differing
national regulations and to address transnational regulatory
problems that exceed purely domestic capabilities.”55 These actions
operate below the radar screen of what we normally consider to be
51. Id. at 388 (citations and footnotes omitted).
52. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 387 (citations and footnotes omitted).
54. Richard B. Stewart, Essay, Administrative Law In The Twenty‐first Century, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 437, 455 (2003).
55. Id. This is reinforced by the observation of Krause and Nye that “[w]ith the growth
of economic interdependence, more bureaucracies that were once considered domestic
become involved in international affairs. Many bureaucracies and agencies of governments
have similar interests. In some cases, the similarity of interests is greater across national lines
than it is with competing domestic agencies and interests.” Lawrence B. Kraus & Joseph S.
Nye, Reflections on the Economics and Politics of International Economic Organizations, 29
INT’L ORGS. 323, 337 (1975) (emphasis added).

OECD GW ARTICLE FINALSALZMAN_ARTICLE_EME.DOC

120

The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.

3/1/2012 12:46 PM11:06 AM

[Vol. 43

lawmaking activities but may significantly influence agency
activities. As Stewart notes, a horizontal network of agency officials
may agree informally to a common regulatory policy that is
subsequently implemented domestically by participating U.S.
regulators through rulemaking or enforcement actions. While
these domestic implementing decisions are subject to U.S.
administrative law procedures and judicial review, the
underlying policy was adopted through extranational processes
that are not. Moreover, in some cases there may be no formal
domestic decision at all, but merely administrative exercise of
discretion—for example, a decision not to enforce U.S.
requirements against imported products because of a prior
informal agreement on functional equivalence or mutual
recognition of regulatory standards.56

VI. NEGOTIATION FORUM SHOPPING
The second lesson one can draw from the OECD’s involvement in
international law‐making is the dynamic of negotiation forum
shopping. In a world of overlap among international organizations,
competition inevitably results as institutions maneuver for the
scarce attention and resources of sovereign states. Forum shopping
is an important aspect of litigation in the United States, as parties
seek jurisdictions most favorable to their position, and it is no less
important in the international community. As Krause and Nye have
observed:
Too little attention is given to the political process by which
agendas are set in world politics. The choice of organizational
arena often has an important effect on setting the agenda.
Moreover, the different jurisdictional scope and the differing
composition of delegations to different organizations frequently
result in quite different distributions of influence and outcomes.
The same issue may come out quite differently in the GATT than
in UNCTAD. States try to steer issues to power arenas more
favorable to their preferred outcomes.

What does an international institution need to develop a
meaningful agreement? It needs information, key players at the
table, and a formal structure to hammer out differences. The OECD
provides all three. The central defining feature of the OECD, though,
is its membership. The term, “OECD nations” clearly conveys
images of wealthy industrialized countries, of a rich man’s club, just
as UNCTAD denotes images of developing countries with export‐
based economies. The importance of the OECD members’ like‐
mindedness cannot be overestimated, nor can the organization’s
56. Stewart, supra note 54, at 456.
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explicitly economic perspective on policy issues. While the OECD
may be chosen to work on an issue because of its powerful research
capacity, it may also be chosen by a member country as a competing
forum to other institutions working on the same issue. The OECD
was chosen in part as the negotiating forum for the MAI because of
its in‐house expertise, but its members’ commitment to economic
liberalization was surely significant as well. Negotiations on the
MAI commenced at the OECD only after earlier attempts to
negotiate an MAI at the broader‐based WTO had failed. Similarly,
negotiation of the OECD Guidelines commenced at the OECD during
the same period that efforts to develop corporate codes of conduct
at the United Nations became blocked. The same could be said for
the Bribery Convention and Hazardous Waste Trade. Continuing
negotiation at the OECD ensured not only a greater likelihood of
reaching a final agreement, but an agreement that promoted
economic liberalism.57
The “build it and they will come” strategy of negotiation followed
in the MAI, Basel Convention, and other examples cited in this
Article, though, clearly shows that an expanded membership may
not be necessary to set the agendas of other institutions. While the
OECD’s restricted membership allows it to reach agreements that
could not be brokered in more inclusive fora, once such agreements
have been completed it provides the impetus and grounding for
development of treaties and conventions at other IGOs. This
strategy of reaching agreement at the OECD and then passing the
adopted text to IGOs with broader membership is one of
foundation‐laying, though it can equally be viewed as strategic
preemption.58
This ability to reach agreement on issues that international
organizations with larger membership have previously been unable
to address meaningfully has been a unique strength of the OECD.59
Much as a small negotiating committee exercises enormous
influence by brokering deals that are then passed to the plenary for
further discussion and potential adoption, by brokering an
agreement among its members and then offering it to outside
parties (either with no chance of amendment, as in the MAI case, or
for development of a more comprehensive agreement as with the
Basel Convention) the scope of possible compromises is effectively
57. Salzman & Terracino, supra note 2, at 393–94 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 395.
59. Id. at 322.
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set.60 This strategy relies on the importance of path dependence in
fixing the trajectory for future development. There are, of course,
limits to such a strategy. The OECD’s ability to set agendas is
substantially weakened if the member countries cannot agree
amongst themselves, the competing institutions have the capacity
to broker separate agreements, or there exist few incentives for
other countries to follow the OECD’s lead.61
By providing a forum for government officials and
nongovernmental experts to meet and share research and
experiences on cutting edge policy issues, the OECD can frame the
issues for future collective consideration, lay the groundwork for
agreement and identify whose the influential voices in the policy
debate shall be.62

60. Id. at 396. A related form of agenda‐setting that bears mention is sheer numbers.
If OECD member country can form a common position (even absent a formal agreement),
they represent a considerable voting bloc in other international organizations. During the
author’s time at the OECD, for example, the Environment Directorate held a special meeting
of its Environment Committee to prepare for the U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development. While agreement was not reached on a number of issues (particularly the
Convention on Biological Diversity), this process developed a number of common policy
positions among the member countries. Id. at 396 n.209.
61. Id. at 397.
62. Id. at 387 (citations and footnotes omitted).

